BlackCat is positioned to pivot to individualized, customized attacks due to the numerous options available when coding in Rust. Rust programming has gained momentum due to its fast and high performance, powerful web application development, low overhead for embedded programming, and memory management resolution. Rust also facilitates the BlackCat author due to its efficiency regarding algorithms that power the encryption capability of the ransomware. Because of its efficiency and adaptability, BlackCat has been seen targeting both Windows and Linux systems.
Each ALPHV ransomware executable includes a JSON configuration that allows customization of extensions, ransom notes, how data will be encrypted, excluded folders/files/extensions, and the services and processes to be automatically terminated.
The ransomware is entirely command-line driven, human-operated, and highly configurable, with the ability to use different encryption routines, spread between computers, kill virtual machines and ESXi VMs, and automatically wipe ESXi snapshots to prevent recovery.
While analyzing the ransomware configurations, we observed numerous evasion tactics deployed. These evasion techniques are used in an effort to impair or disable system defenses as well as to stop certain applications that may lock files open on disk, causing problems when trying to encrypt them. BlackCat attempts to kill several processes and services to hinder or prevent security solutions and backups. The process list checked is as follows:
agntsvc, dbeng50, dbsnmp, encsvc, excel, firefox, infopath, isqlplussvc, msaccess, mspub, mydesktopqos, mydesktopservice, notepad, ocautoupds, ocomm, ocssd, onenote, oracle, outlook, powerpnt, sqbcoreservice, sql, steam, synctime, tbirdconfig, thebat, thunderbird, visio, winword, wordpad, xfssvccon, *sql*, bedbh, vxmon, benetns, bengien, pvlsvr, beserver, raw_agent_svc, vsnapvss, CagService, QBIDPService, QBDBMgrN, QBCFMonitorService, SAP, TeamViewer_Service, TeamViewer, tv_w32, tv_x64, CVMountd, cvd, cvfwd, CVODS, saphostexec, saposcol, sapstartsrv, avagent, avscc, DellSystemDetect, EnterpriseClient, VeeamNFSSvc, VeeamTransportSvc, VeeamDeploymentSvc
The services running on the compromised system are checked against the following list:
mepocs, memtas, veeam, svc$, backup, sql, vss, msexchange, sql$, mysql, mysql$, sophos, MSExchange, MSExchange$, WSBExchange, PDVFSService, BackupExecVSSProvider, BackupExecAgentAccelerator, BackupExecAgentBrowser, BackupExecDiveciMediaService, BackupExecJobEngine, BackupExecManagementService, BackupExecRPCService, GxBlr, GxVss, GxClMgrS, GxCVD, GxCIMgr, GXMMM, GxVssHWProv, GxFWD, SAPService, SAP, SAP$, SAPD$, SAPHostControl, SAPHostExec, QBCFMonitorService, QBDBMgrN, QBIDPService, AcronisAgent, VeeamNFSSvc, VeeamDeploymentService, VeeamTransportSvc, MVArmor, MVarmor64, VSNAPVSS, AcrSch2Svc
In an effort to maintain persistence, the BlackCat ransomware excludes key system and application folders – as well as key components – from encryption so as not to render the system and ransomware inoperative. The folders excluded are as follows:
system volume information, intel, $windows.~ws, application data, $recycle.bin, mozilla, $windows.~bt, public, msocache, windows, default, all users, tor browser, programdata, boot, config.msi, google, perflogs, appdata, windows.old
Excluded file names are as follows:
desktop.ini, autorun.inf, ntldr, bootsect.bak, thumbs.db, boot.ini, ntuser.dat, iconcache.db, bootfont.bin, ntuser.ini, ntuser.dat.log
Any file with an extension matching the following list will also be avoided:
themepack, nls, diagpkg, msi, lnk, exe, cab, scr, bat, drv, rtp, msp, prf, msc, ico, key, ocx, diagcab, diagcfg, pdb, wpx, hlp, icns, rom, dll, msstyles, mod, ps1, ics, hta, bin, cmd, ani, 386, lock, cur, idx, sys, com, deskthemepack, shs, ldf, theme, mpa, nomedia, spl, cpl, adv, icl, msu
Hardcoded credentials stored within the BlackCat ransomware config lend credence to the likelihood that specific victims are being targeted. The credentials also allow BlackCat to move laterally within the victim’s system and/or network, often with administrative privileges. Credential access permits the ransomware to deploy additional tools that further propagate the attack. These observations have also been confirmed by Symantec.
Last modified 6mo ago